As Yemen's internal war continues to drag on with no end in sight, there is increased risk of miscalculations that may lead to further escalation and internationalization of the conflict. Increased regional and international geopolitical competition, continued efforts to combat the threat of international terrorism and Islamic extremism emanating from the region, and maritime security concerns that threaten the global economy and freedom of navigation have only increased Yemen's strategic importance to the national security agendas of regional and international actors alike. 1 Such considerations have not been lost on Yemen's domestic incumbent and insurgent elites, contributing, in part, to political and military strategies that seek to manage but not entirely eliminate internal security threats that pose challenges to the national security interests of regional and international actors. As such, Houthi expansionism and the ongoing internal war may be better understood in the context of the development of a domestic elite strategic culture that has contributed to perpetual insecurity and internal war in Yemen. Strategic culture can be described as traditional practices and habits of thought by which military force is organized and employed by a society in the service of its political goals. When viewed through the lens of strategic culture, Houthi expansionism, and internal war in Yemen generally, should not be viewed as an aberration that seeks to change the status quo. Rather, it should be considered a continuation of established political norms and military-decision making institutionalized under the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, which seeks to balance a host of internal and external actors and potential threats within an environment dominated by elite competition and internal factionalization, in the absence of effective state institutions and a clear monopoly on the use of violence by the state. Such a governing strategy has contributed to the proliferation of militias and other irregular and non-state forces, military factionalization, and increasingly the formation of civil-military relations akin to warlordism, in which military and/or tribal elites exercise civil power at a local or regional level through their influence and control of militias. 2 Within this domestic environment, the military has played a central role in linking a number of disparate groups to the regime, while at the same time factionalization has allowed for effective divide and rule tactics to shield the regime from reprisal. Furthermore, the dependence of the Yemeni economy on a combination of oil revenues, remittances, and, increasingly, foreign aid has left the Yemeni government vulnerable to external market forces and shocks associated with geopolitical competition. Within this geopolitical setting, internal war and perpetual insecurity threatening regional and international interests have supported a growing war economy and helped to prop up the armed forces as a central player in patronage politics and the economy writ large through its role in the tribal-military-commercial complex and the Yemen Economic Corporation (YECO)—formerly the Military Economic Corporation or MECO—, which has its hands in nearly all facets of the Yemeni economy and serves as a conduit for foreign aid.